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T he relationship between shifts in the world marketand ideas on economic development in LatinAmerica contrasted sharply with that in Romania
before the First World War. In the latter country, market failure,
social upheaval, and access to the continuing Russian debate led to
new theoretical responses, in both Marxist and non-Marxist
discourses; in Latin America, the perceived success of the
export-driven economies, combined with institutional factors and the
absence or feebleness of certain critical traditions known in Romania,
resulted in a prolonged inability to mount a theoretical attack on the
"outward-directed development" prescribed by the Ricardian thesis of
comparative advantage. Thus in Latin America, with which this essay
is principally concerned, both Marxist and non-Marxist challenges to
the region's place in the international division of labor were relatively
ineffective before the War's end. Industrial development was well
underway in some countries before government policy pushed in the
same direction, and a theoretical justification of industrializaion came
last — even if it was the first important Third World contribution to
development economics.
The essay first considers the economic experience of four major
countries in the region — Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and Mexico — and
then turns to the social situation of the Latin American intellectuals
and their ideological responses in these and other nations to the shifts
wrought within their countries by the international economy. The
larger part of the paper deals with intellectuals and their ideas, and
includes explicit comparisons with Romania, the eastern European
country with some important similarities to, and instructive
differences from, Latin America; it was also the one whose intellectual
traditions had a direct impact on Latin America, through the works of
Mihail Manoilescu.
*' Também publicado na Reriew do "Fernand Braudel Center" (E.U.A), à qual agradeço a autorização para
republicar este texto.
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In the years from independence down to the Great Depression, Latin
America was subject to three Kondratieff waves. The first was
unfortunately timed, because the London stock market crash occurred
in 1825, just as some Latin American governments were seeking
foreign loans to rebuild their shattered mercantilist economies
(Hernández y Sánchez-Barba, 1971:225). Howerer others, such as
Argentina, had already contracted loans and were now defaulting. In
fact, except for the years 1823-24, Spanish and Portuguese America
received very modest amounts of European investment during the
whole first half of the nineteenth century. The period 1825-50, when
such investiment might have occurred, roughly corresponds to the
"B" (down-swing) phase of the Kondratieff wave. For a variety of
reasons, of which the lack of foreign funding was probably second
only to political disorder, Latin America experienced export stagnation
and, by implication, little economic growth in those years
(Halperín-Donghi, 1985:304).
Chile established a stable constitutional regime in 1833, and was
widely admired in Spanish America for its stability. Brazil had done so
earlier (1824), but only overcame the fissiparous tendencies of its
agrarian elites after 1848. Mexico and Argentina would not know
stable regimes until the 1860's. Many exports that helped make stable
polities possible had their origins in the colonial period, but new ones
developed in the middle decades of the nineteenth century in response
to Europe's industrial and consumer needs.
Yet it was the last quarter of the century that witnessed a real
transformation of the region's export economies. The so-called Second
Industrial Revolution, associated with technological change in the
production of capital goods and with the application of science to
industry, brought unprecedented investiment, technological
innovations (steamships driven by screw propellers, railroads made of
Bessemer steel, refrigeration, barbed-wire fencing), and above all a
huge new demand for capital goods inputs (e.g., copper, rubber) and
consumer goods (sugar, wheat, beef, coffee).
In terms of sheer growth, the region benefited immensely more from
the second Kondratieff cycle, peaking in 1870-73, than from the first;
in fact, Latin America continued to receive significant amounts of
foreign investiment through the long depression of 1873-96. The area
received its largest investiment by decade in the 1880 's, partly as a
result of a strong expansion of tropical trade (Mõrner, 1977:459-60).
Yet the region was geared into the European economy at the price of
consolidation of the latifundium and monocultural dependence on the
world market (Hernández y Sanchez-Barbara 1971: 230-31).1
The transformation and dynamization of the Latin American
economies occurred at different times in the histories of the national
states, depending on the export commodities involved and the relative
success of state-building. Chile was affected by overseas demands as
early as the 1850's (copper exports to Europe, wheat to California),
(1) Nonetheless, these estates were highly differentiated across the region as to the modernity of their technology,
business practices, and labor relations.
and Argentina and Brazil followed in the 1860's. But the period
1870-90 provided a much more rapid ascent. These countries, plus
Mexico, now felt the full impact or the combined effects of the
European economic expansion, which, in the Argentine and Brazilian
cases, brought in its train unprecedented levels of European
immigration.
Argentina is the best exemplar of these processes; it was created as a
nation — in the sense of having had its national territory definitively
brought under a single regime — in the third quarter of the
nineteenth century. Formal political unity was achieved in 1859-61,
with the accession of Buenos Aires Province to the Argentine
Federation. But the governance issue was resolved only in the
following two decades, whith the closing of the Indian frontier in
Patagonia; the suppression of the last regional revolt; and the creation
of a Federal District, separating the city of Buenos Aires from the
province of the, same name (1880).
Argentina's economic growth was spectacular. On the average, exports
increased 5% a year between 1875 and 1914, both by quantum and by
value. From 1.6 milion kilos of wool in 1840, Argentina was
exporting 211 milion kilos per annum by the late 1890's (peak years).
Profiting from the invention of refrigerated shipping, Argentina began
to export frozen beef in 1885, sending abroad 328,000 tons in 1914,
in which year chilled beef (a higher-grade commodity not produced in
1885) accounted for 41,000 tons. Overseas sales of canned meat in
the same interval expanded ten times. Meanwhile wheat exports
increased twenty-three times in value from 1880-84 to 1890-94.
Transatlantic sales of both wheat and maize rose so rapidly that they
had replaced beef as the chief exports by value on the eve of the First
World War (Glade, 1986: 10-11). In the words of Diaz-Alejandro,
"From 1860 to 1930 Argentina grew at a rate that has few parallels in
economic history, perhaps comparable only to the performance during
the same period of other countries of recent settlement" (1970:2).
Other countries were less completely transformed than was Argentina,
with the debatable exception of it small neighbor, Uruguay, but the
three others treated here — Brazil, Chile, and Mexico — were all
profoundly affected by the forces we associate with the Second
Industrial Revolution and the Age of Imperialism. Brazil's gross
domestic product, for example, grew at a faster annual rate (2.5%)
than did those of developed countries between 1920 and 1929 (Dean,
1986: 685).
Land tenure patterns changed in response to international demand,
and it is abundantly clear that estate owners were generally responsive
to price signals (see, e.g., Leff, 1982: II, 43-51; Jacobsen, 1984:
488-89). The first victim of estate-owner's land-hunger after 1850 was
the Catholic Church, controlling as much as a third of the rural real
estate in early nineteenth-century Mexico. One historian has remarked
in this regard that the greatest service of the state to the landowning
class was the forced sale of Church property — though this was much
more important in Mexico than in the other countries considered here
(Bauer, 1986: 177). Yet peasants suffered too. Even in remote
Andean villages, peasants began to lose their land as high prices for
sheep and alpaca wool brought about a diminution of peasant
holdings (referring to southern Petu, facobsen, 1984: 489). Estate
owners in Chile began to engross peasant lands in the 1850's and
1860's (inferred from Bauer & Johnson, 1977: 88-89). In Argentina,
the latifundium arose in the nineteenth century, despite an open
frontier stretching southward by the 1880's to Patagonia; likewise, the
rise of the large plantation in São Paulo, Brazil was a product of the
nineteenth, and even the twentieth, centuries. In Brazil's census of
1920, only 3% of the rural population owned land, and of that group,
10% owned three-fourths of the rural property (Dean, 1986: 702). In
Mexico, the hacienda had its origins in the seventeenth century, but
the Mexican Revolution of 1910 had as one principal source the vast
and unprecedented alienation of community lands by latifundistas
during the dictatorship of Porfirio Díaz (1876-1911). For Spanish
America as a whole, Bauer remarks, the rural population "probably
underwent a greater change [in 1870-1930] than at any previous time
... except for the conquest" (1986: 185).
Labor systems associated with the export boom varied widely, but
often involved coercive elements. In the case of Brazil (led by the
dynamic province of São Paulo), the coffee economy bid away
thousands of slaves from other provinces in the 1860's and 1870's; in
the 1880's slavery gave way to European immigrant labor based on a
unique mix of wages, free housing, and usufruct. Elsewhere in Brazil
the condition of rural labor was considerably worse. In Argentina,
where the "Mesopotamian" region north of Buenos Aires became
one of the world's great wheat granaries, the land was subdivided and
leased to Italian tenant farmers. In the Argentine case, and to a lesser
extent in southern Brazil, there was a low labor-to-land ratio that
resulted in relatively high rural wages.
In Chile, a rising demand for labor in the wheat farming area of the
Central Valley coupled with the expansion of large estates led to a;
worsening of the peasant's lot in tenancy arrangements ( inquilinaje) in
wheat farming, and to an increasing proletarianization of the inquilinos
and other peasants (Kay, 1980: 76) .2 Mexico had perhaps the largest
variety of labor systems by the turn of the century, including illegal
but de facto slavery for the Yaqui and Maya Indians, instances of debt
servitude, sharecropping, and in some places rural wage labor and
tenancy (Katz, 1974). Vagrancy laws forced the proletarianization of
Indians and mestizo peasants in Central America and parts of Mexico.
In Argentina such laws were important in remote Tucumán, but also
on the pampa, where the vanishing gaucho encountered similar
legislation (Glade, 1986: 37; Slatta, 1983: 106-25).
Thus, Latin American rural labor systems became much more highly
differentiated as a result of the transformations after 1870. Whereas
"parts of Latin America, like eastern Europe, experienced a sort of
second enfeudation with the spread of a capital market" (Glade, 1986:
38), the immigrant-populated wheat regions of Argentina and the
(2) In neighboring Peru, as late as 1920, the government introduced corvée labor (conscriptión vial) for the Indian
population (Bauer, 1986:177).
coffee regions of Brazil had modern labor and tenancy systems. A
great contrast existed between the rural labor systems of Chile and
Argentina, despite their common export booms in wheat (though the
timing and markets were different), and despite Chile's impressive
advance in manufacturinf (see below). In Chile, the population-land
ratio was considerably higher than in Argentina, the latifundist elite
probably more unified, and land rents less differentiated. The
lastnamed element was related to the striking differences between the
relative independence of southern European immigrants (many of
whom were literate) in Argentina, and the dependent inquilinos in
Chile, where deference to the landlords was demanded and rendered.
In the view of one student, Chile followed the "Junker route" to
agricultural capitalism in the nineteenth century. Chile's rural society,
it is argured, was close to Gutswirtschaft, while Argentina
approximated Grundherrschaft, with its widespread rural leasing,
despite á relative concentration of rural property ownership (Kay,
1980: 20, 45-46; Laclau, 1969: 300-08).
The nature of the process of production during and after this period is
the subject of much controversy today; those who denned a feudal"
interpretation of the production system usually have in mind
manorialism, which, as Marc Bloch pointed out, antedated feudalism
and survived its demise (1961:I, 279; II, 442). The hacienda of this
period is sometimes seen as poised between two worlds — the inner
one of dependency and even extra-economic coercion of the labor
force, and the outer one recognizably capitalistic in its response to
world markets (Pablo Macera, cited in Bartra, 1976: 81).3 A similar
pattern has been observed in eastern Europe, as we shall see in the
Romanian case.
Yet Latin America before 1930, like some regions of eastern Europe,
was not simply an exporter of primary commodities with variegated
labor systems. Recent research has established that manufacturing in
Chile, Argentina, Mexico, and Brazil was well established before the
First World War; thus, contrary to received wisdom, the War did nor
create Latin American industry ex nihilo. Rather, it provided the
opportunity for the full use of existing capacity, involving in some
plants three shifts a day, as the hulls of North Atlantic suppliers failed
to ply Latin American waters over a five-year period. Yet the War may
have on balance inhibited industrialization (as opposed to raising
industrial output) because of the inability of industrialists to import
capital goods during the conflict. Output and capital investiment had
different rhythms until the late 1930's, when the larger Latin
American countries began to produce capital goods in significant
quantities for the first time.4
Perhaps the most advanced couintry, in terms of the structural
transformation of its economy in the prewar era, was Chile, where,
Palma (1979) has shown, industrial development was extensive
between 1875 and 1900, although the earlier literature emphasizes
(3) Few now accept the view associated with Sergio Bagú, Caio Prado, Jr., and André Gunder Frank that a sempiternal
capitalism characterized Latin America from the Conquest onward; one reason for rejecting this interpretation is
that it does not allow for a transition to capitalism (see Duncan & Rutledge, 1977: 4-5).
(4) For a summary of the debate on the Brazilian case, on which the literature is largest, see Love (1980b: 53-61).
lost opportunities for modernization under the regime of a traditional
landed oligarchy. True enough, these were the halcyon years of
"outward directed growth," based on Chile's fabulous nitrate fields,
many of them wrested from Bolivia and Peru in the War of the Pacific
(1879-83). In the succeding years the elite introduced a fiscal system
that was heavily dependent on export taxes, and government services
were tailored to the needs of latifundistas and mineral exporters.
Nonetheless, Palma found, import-substitution industrialization —
prescribed by the U. N. Economic Commissign for Latin America
after 1949 — was already well underway in Chile by 1914, and was
reaching its limits by 1934, much earlier than in other countries. He
also found a correlation between export growth and the growth of
manufacturing before the First World War, but not later. Palma
argues for Chile, as Dean does for Brazil, that export expansion was a
precondition of industrialization (Palma, 1979: 102, 328, 345; Dean,
1969: 3-9). Later than Romania by five years, Chile was nonetheless
the first Latin American country in which the state extended credits to
manufacturers, beginning in 1928. But more meaningful aid only
came after 1939 (see below).
The First World War caused serious disruptions in the Latin American
export economy, and grave problems followed the War in certain
commodity markets, but the export boom continued in phase with the
third Kondratieff wave. A major structural shift in the postwar era was
the growing displacement of Great Britain by the United States as
chief lender and investor. Great Britain exacerbated its problems in the
region by overvaluing the pound through deliberate deflation. In any
case, U. S. advances resulting from the War were evident everywhere.
For instance, the Americans sent 3.5 times as many exports (by value)
to Mexico as the British did in 1913, and the ratio was 10 to 1 by
1927. Great Britain led the United States in the other three countries
considered here in 1913, but by 1927 the latter had dislodged Great
Britain as the leading trading partner in Chile and Brazil. In
Argentina, Great Britain clung to its lead by a single percentage point
(Thorp, 1986: 66).
Though Great Britain's overall capital investiments in the region were
still larger in 1929, the U. S. had far outstripped Great Britain in its
postwar lending, both direct and indirect. Unfortunately for Latin
America, U. S. policies were not as well geared to maintaining the
international trading system as Great Britain's had been. The United
States remained highly protectionist, while North American banks
"pressed loans on unwary governments" in Latin America (Thorp,
1986: 61). The problem was insufficient means for repayment, since
the U. S. raised barriers to trade that affected multilateral commerce
as well as individual nations' trade. Argentina especially found itself in
straits, since it sought both American investiment and industrial goods
(notably motor vehicles), but could not sell to the U. S., partly
because of lack of complementarity between the two countries' rural
economies.
If the displacement of Great Britain was one structural change after
the War, another was increasing commodity export instability. This
problem was no less than a disaster in the case of rubber, which briefly
rivaled coffee as Brazil's leading foreign-exchange earner in the prewar
era. Brazil not only lost its place as the world s leading suppler, but
ceased even to be a consequential supplier between 1912 and 1920,
when southeast Asian plantations went into high gear.5 Another
problem — technological innovation — beset the exporters of Chilean
nitrates, as a result of ingenuity in the German chemical industry
during the First World War. Violent price fluctuations on world
markets also afflicted Argentine wheat and wool.
The diffusion of new agricultural technology in the 1920 's — most
dramatically the tractor — greatly increased the productive capacity of
wheat farms in Argentina and elsewhere in the world, and thus helped
bring down prices. Another agricultural problem was self-inflicted:
Brazil's coffee stockpiling — the valorization program — was
promoting ever-greater production of that commodity, whose prices
would collapse in 1929 — a few weeks before "Black Thursday "on
the New York Stock Exchange.
On top of these problems came deteriorating terms of trade after the
War. On the average the terms of trade for all primary products in
1926-29 had significantly dropped below their levels in 1913 (Thorp,
1986: 62).
The impact of the Great Depression was severe. Already in 1929,
unsold and unsaleable coffee stocks in Sao Paulo were valued at 10%
of Brazil's gross domestic product, and the situation would worsen
over the next four years, as new trees began to produce (Dean, 1986:
721). In Argentina, the dollar value of exports in 1933 was one-third
the 1929 figure, and Chile's export performance, if anything, was
worse. The depression unseated governments in all three countries.
Mexico was spared political upheaval, perhaps because of the growing
consolidation of the revolutionary regime after the founding of the
official party in 1929.
The 1930's were a period of significant structural change for the
larger Latin American economies: Convertibility and the gold
standard were abandoned early in the depression in Argentina, Brazil,
Chile, and Mexico. In those countries, the rise in prices of
importables, because of a fall in terms of trade and exchange
devaluation, encouraged the substitution of domestic manufactures for
imported goods, as did expansionary fiscal and monetary policies.6
Argentina, Brazil, and Chile made rapid advances in industrial
production during the early depression years, so that by 1935 a North
American economist would hazard that "There is probably no major
section of the world in which there is greater industrial activity relative
to predepression years than in temperate South America" (i.e.,
Argentina, southern Brazil, and Chile) (Phelps, 1935: 281). When
war came in 1939, manufactures in international trade became scarce
again, permitting industrial advances to the extent that capital goods,
fuel, and raw materials were available.
(5) In 1911 Brazil exported 38,500 tons of rubber; by 1930, it only exported 6,000 tons (Dean, 1986:695). As Dean
notes, it is remarkable that Brazil, a country of continental proportions, should become dependent on a single
crop, coffee, for three-fourths its export earnings in the latter 1920's (1986:695-96).
(6) There was less import substitution industrialization in other parts of Latin America (Diaz-Alejandro, 1970:12).
II
The preceding survey of economic transformation, however brief,
provides a foundation for understanding the ways in which Latin
American social thinkers and statesmen of the era conceptualized their
nation's place in the order of things. It will be argued that the
perceived success of the "open economy" strategy, beginning in the
mid-nineteenth century with rising levels of exports in Chile,
Argentina, and Brazil, shaped the terms of ideological discourse even
into the 1940 's. However, before preceding to the ideologies that
attracted Latin Americans and were in turn adapted by them to local
conditions, it is necessary to consider the sociological situation of the
intellectuals who were the bearers of such ideas and values.
The intellectual traditions of Latin America revolved around the
pensador (lit., thinker), a man who prided himself on his broad culture
and who eschewed specialization: He often wrote as readily about
contemporary sociology and politics as he did about literature, and his
studies frequently crossed disciplinary lines. The pensador's vehicle
was the essay, a literary form that in Latin America retains the prestige
it has all but lost in the English-speaking world.7 The style perhaps
was appropriate to highly stratified, pre-industrial societies; in any
case the pensador often wrote without reference to monographic
studies. His judgments tended to be definitive; his treatment,
historical. Before 1900, and even later, few Latin American essayists
were academics, and fewer still had studied in Europe. If they had,
they almost never took research degrees.
One feature distinguishing Latin American society from that of
eastern Europe in this period is a relative lack of an intelligentsia, in
the classical sense of an underemployed intellectual community
radically at odds with prevailing power structures. This fact owes
chiefly to the limited number of university students, compared to
employment opportunities in law, journalism, and civil service.
Furthermore, intellectuals frequently held important political posts.
Such intelligentsia as existed was composed as often as not of
self-educated men like Afonso Henriques Lima Barreto, the Brazilian
novelist and radical social critic, and Jose Carlos Mariátegui, the
Peruvian Marxist. But such figures were realtively so few as to lack the
group-consciousness one associates with an intelligentsia; they were
perhaps closer to a bohemia.8 More conventional intellectuals in
university posts, for example, were usually less radical, though often
(7) In the postwar era, note, for example, the impact of the essays The Economic Development of Latin America and its
Principal Problems by Raúl Prebisch (considered below; United Nations, 1950), and Dependency and Development
in Latin America by Fernando Henrique Cardoso and Enzo Faletto (1979, first published in 1969), the most
widely-cited and reprinted statement on dependency.
(8) Something of a proto-intelligentsia can be found in the Latin American student movement, which began with a
manifesto at Argentina's University of Córdoba in 1918, and spread within four years as far north as Cuba and
Mexico. The Córdoba Manifesto, directed at " the free men of America," called for the democratization of the
university system in the following ways: compulsory class attendance was to be abolished; there was to be no limit
on the number of times a student could fail a course; tuition fees were to be terminated; the university was to
function as a sanctuary for political activists against reactionary governments; and students were to be equally
represented with professors and graduates on governing councils of universities.
Though these reforms were intended to bring the sons of workers and peasants the benefits of higher education,
in fact they only opened the lecture halls to the middle classes. The bottleneck of secondary education, dominated
by private schools, remained the insuperable barrier for the children of the lower classes. Over time, especially in
those countries where the universities, like other institutions, were weak (such as Cuba and Peru), the professional
student appeared. But prior to 1930. or even 1945, there were relatively so few university graduates that only a
small number of educated unemployables existed.
reformist in orientation. In any event, seldom could the pensador be
Gramsci's "organic intellectual," a spokesman for well-defined class
interests, since social classes were still relatively inchoate.
A sociological reason for the persistence of the pensador tradition is
that academic institutions were seldom oriented toward research. In
addition, Latin America suffered from a relative dearth of social
research institutions as such. There was nothing comparable to
Dimitri Gusti's Romanian Institute of Social Science, founded in
1918. Romania also boasted an Economics Institute (established in
1921), and a Business Cycles Institute, modeled in 1933 on those at
Harvard and the University of Berlin. The only analogous institutes
anywhere in Latin America in the 1920's and 1930's were the research
division of the Argentine Central Bank, which Raul Prebisch
organized in 1928, and an economics research institute founded at the
University of Mexico (UNAM) in the same year.
In Hate's survey of Latin American social and political thought over
the half century ending in 1930, only one intellectual of some ninety
treated, the Mexican Manuel Gamio, held a Ph.D.(1986: 434, n.
138).9Such a fact might imply the weakness of a research tradition, as
opposed to the abstract theorizing and indifference to the systematic
collection of a data so characteristic of the pensador style. There was,
for example, nothing to compare with the Romanian comunity studies
of the 1920's and 1930's carried out by Gusti and his students, based
on the theories and methods of Le Play and Chayanov. The partial
exception was provided by Mexico, where Gamio and other
anthropologists had begun to map out local village ethnography.
III
The pensadores at issue lived in an age of triumphant liberalism, with
manifold sub-themes and arabesques. In Latin America, as elsewhere,
liberalism implied the diffusion of materialism, rationalism, and
pluralism (the latter used by reformist states against the Church).
Liberalism gained strength in the middle decades of the nineteenth
century, as economic advances improved the climate for the reception
of liberal economic ideas (Safford, 1985: 353-54). Following the
European lead, Latin American liberalism changed over the course of
the century, and in the early years of independence its paladins focused
on opening international trade, secularization, and securing equality
before the law in a society still dominated by estates and corporations.
Late in the century, when liberal politicians reigned supreme, there
was much less concern with individual rights: "English liberties"
were frequently seen as less important than economic growth and the
orderly development of the social organism. Thus liberalism, in Hale's
words, was transformed over the course of the nineteenth century
from an "ideology in conflict with the inherited colonial order" into
a "unifying [establishment] myth" (1986: 369). It also offered a
rationale for social control within the new order.
In general, Latin America statesmen and intellectuals welcomed the
economic transformation of their region accompanying the Second
(9) Gamio studied anthropology at Columbia University with Franz Boas. I do not wish to exaggerate the difference
between Romania and Latin America in this regard; the two Romanians who receive the most attention below,
Constantin Dobrogeanu-Gherea and Mihail Manoilescu, did not hold doctorates. But they debated men who did,
which fact surely affected the level of discourse.
Industrial Revolution and the expansion of European trade; thus there
was little debate about the desirability of integration into the dynamic
North Atlantic center as an agricultural and mineral periphery, in
contrast to the eastern European response by the 1880's. Latin
Americans embraced the doctrine of comparative advantage, though
few were aware of Ricardo 's formal demonstration that a comparative
(relative) advantage in the production of two goods in two countries
implied mutual benefit to both trading partners. The vast majority of
Latin American "economists" simply argued from the perception of
absolute advantage, i.e., they saw world commerce as a mutually
beneficial process among countries with highly differentiated natural
and social endowments.
But the penetration of European trade and investment was, for the
Latin American statesmen of the latter half of the nineteenth century,
far more than an acceleration of economic growth; they viewed it as
part of a transformation from "barbarism" to "civilization," as a
future president of Argentina, Domingo Faustino Sarmiento, put it in
his Facundo of 1845(1961). Here there seems to be a parallel with
the Balkan countries of the same era, as the Turkish Empire receded.
Indeed, some Spanish American statesmen and intellectuals, especially
in the second quarter of the century, regarded the culture of the
intransigent and irreconcilable Spanish metropolis, where the
Inquisition survived until 1820, as the most important cause of Latin
America's backwardness. For Francisco Bilbao, a leading figure in
Chile's Generation of 1842, " Spain [was] the Middle Ages."
Consequently, Latin American intellectuals tended to view the myriad
changes associated with capitalist relations of production and exchange
after 1870 as a benign, progressive, and civilizing process. Liberal
intellectuals toward the end of the century were in a celebratory
mood, eager to create heroic myths, as did the historian and statesman
Bartolomé Mitre (president of Argentina, 1862-68). Surviving
"feudal" or archaic elements in local societies were for these men
simply the residues of the colonial regime, doomed by the linear
march of progress associated with capitalist development. Apart from
the pamphlet literature of radical sectors of the labor movement
(largely anarchist), there was no " teratological perception" of
capitalist transformation such an Constantin Dobrogeanu-Gherea
provided in his analysis of Romanian society in 1910 (see below). All
the same, compulsory labor systems and the concentration of land
ownership in Mexico were underlying causes of the revolution that
began in the year Gherea published; to a lesser extent such conditions
obtained in some areas of the other three countries under
consideration. Where injustice was denounced by bourgeois
intellectuals, as in Los grandes problemas nacionales (1909) by the
Mexican Andrés Molina Enriquez, the fault lay not in the system, but
in its local distortions.10
(10) Molina Enriquez was a reformer facing a revolutionary situation. Written in 1909, one year before the outbreak
of the Mexican Revolution, his book was legalistic in approach, and his denunciations of the latifundium included
the evils of absenteeism and low productivity decried by the eighteenth-century Sapnish philosopbe Gaspar
Jovellanos, whom Molina cites. Molina displays an ambivalence toward foreign capital, and sees it as less sinister
than the creole faction (those descended from " pure" Spaniards). While urging land reform, he concurred with
the científicos(establishrnent positivists) in defending the Díaz dictatorship. Molina did so because he believed the
regime was appropriate for Mexico given its state of evolution at the time, despite the fact that much of the
concentration of property had occured through Diaz's efforts to alienate public lands and village commons (1909:
90,313,346).
Until the twentieth century, liberalism in Latin America, unlike
Romania, was strikingly cosmopolitan, as perhaps befitted the
"open" economies of the region.11 Nationalism began to replace
cosmopolitanism gradually — in part because of resentment against
the flood of immigrants in Argentina, in part because of the disillusion
with cosmopolitanism that Latin Americans experienced in August,
1914, and in part because of the disarticulation of the international
economy after 1929.
The years of "conflict" for liberalism to which Hale refers began
with independence and continued into the 1870's or even to 1890
(1986).12 Political struggles in the first fifty years of independence,
the nonage of liberalism, revolved around human rights (including the
emancipation of slaves and Indians); the position of the Church in
society, economy, and polity; the place of foreign trade; and the
organization of the state (centralism vs. federalism, taxing powers).
After long struggles, these issues were generally resolved in favor of
an expansion of the number of participating citizens, secularization, an
open economy, and a powerful central government, even though three
of the four countries considered here finally adopted federal
constitutions. The triumph of secularization in some countries had
required a powerful state (Hale, 1986: 377-78), and partly for that
reason liberals in most countries accepted a degree of interventionism
alien to classical liberal precepts.
It is remarkable, perhaps, how poorly articulated at an intellectual
level was the opposition to liberalism, until the 1920 's and 1930's,
when corporatism and Marxism became widely diffused. In the
nineteenth century, opposition to liberalism tended to be organized
around the privileges of the colonial regime, and prelates articulated
the dissatisfaction with republicanism, free-masonry, and other
modern heresies, ticking off the list of Pius IX's Syllabus of Errors
(1864). Of course there was nothing approximating a succesful
bourgeois revolution, to which conservatives might have reacted more
inventively. Almost all the leading intellectuals were liberals: Only
three early statesmen — Lucas Alamán in Mexico, Mariano Egaña in
Chile, and José Bonifacio Andrada e Silva in Brazil — perhaps bore
some resemblance to Edmund Burke, and there were no systematizing
reactionaries in the mold of Joseph de Maistre. Nor was there
anything akin to Slavophilism's mystical association of anti-rationalism
and nationalism, partly because Latin American conservatives were not
reacting to Hegelianism the first fifty years after independence. In the
early years of nationhood, since conservatism was associated with
maintaining or restoring privileges of the old regime, its appeal was
limited. For some, however, conservatism was also an outlook
attaching fundamental importance to "the existence of a perennial
order ... [for which] change always represents an evil: decadence,
perversion, chaos," in Romero's words (1970: 28). Not only was
conservatism closely associated with the Church, a supranational
entity, but in the worst case, Maximilian's Mexico, the Church and the
(11) On the association of liberalism and xenophobia in Romania, see Chirot (1976:108).
(12) They continued even later in Colombia, where the final Liberal reaction came in the War of a Thousand Days,
1899-1902, in which 100,000 people may have died.
Conservative party sold out to the foreign invader, Napoleon III. In
most countries, conservatism in the latter years of the century was to
be most effectively defended within the various currents of liberalism,
especially after liberals consolidated their control of the state.
Liberalism came to Latin America in a variety of forms, beginning
with Benthamism in the 1820 's, and continuing through Social
Darwinism in the 1890's. A related but distinct ideology was Comtian
positivism, influential in ail four countries. French philosophy had
conquered Latin America with the triumph of eclecticism over a dying
scholasticism in the early years of independence, and Comte's
all-embracing system attracted intellectuals trained in scholasticism
more than did British liberalism. Comte's vision of civilization had the
historical process unfolding in three great stages, epistimologically
determined: the theological, the metaphysical, and the positive. In the
first stage, causation was assigned to supernatural forces; in the
second, to abstract forces; and in the third — on the edge of which
humanity stood, he believed, in the mid-nineteenth century — to
discoverable scientific laws.
Comte called for the tempering of capitalism by social morality, and
asserted the need for the state to incorporate the urban proletariat into
modern society with social welfare policies. He also supported
universal elementary education and the separation of Church and
state. Naturally, not all of Comte's specific prescriptions had universal
appeal, especially those produced after his authoritarian turn in the
wake of 1848. The Religion of Humanity of his final years, a
grotesque secularization of Catholicism (Ave Clotilda!), attracted only
a small but vocal sect, especially in Chile and Brazil.
Positivism was attractive to modernizing conservatives, who wanted
the benefits of material progress without sacrificing social hierarchy.
Comte's philosophy seemed to offer a blueprint for development
without social mobilization; the proletariat, as noted, was to be the
special concern of a paternalist state. In addition, we may surmise that
Comtek emphais on the family as the fundamental unit of social
organization — as opposed to the individual, in British liberalism —
made his system especially seductive. (Corporatism would make the
same assertion in our own century).
In the 1870's Comtian positivism was closely linked to
nation-building, and it became the official philosophy of new national
normal schools in Chile, Mexico, and Argentina; it played the same
role at the national military academy in Brazil. Comte's phrase
"Order and Progress"seemed to be in tune with new consolidating
regimes, and it became the official motto of the new Brazilian
Republic.
Yet Herbert Spencer's Social Darwinism had a wider following by the
1890's; Spencer seemed to represent the interests of a nascent but
increasingly self-confident bourgeoisie, at least in Argentina (Zea,
1963: 216-17, 227).13 By the last two decades of the century, Spencer
(13) On Spencer's influence in Brazil, see Graham (1968:232-51). Spencer's long-term influence, however, given his
strong emphasis on individualism and hostility to the state, was probably less important than that of Comte,
whose values were more in tune with the Latin American ethos. (Personal communication from Charles A. Hale.)
also provided a convenient rationalization for dictatorships, which
now had a new staying power, partly because of new revenues
resulting from economic growth. Such was the case with the
government of Rafael Nuñez, the dictator of Colombia in the 1880's,
who used Social Darwinism to justify his "scientific peace." In
Mexico, where the writings of Comte after 1848 could already could
be construed as justifying dictatorship, Social Darwinism was likewise
pressed into service for the Porfiriato. For the científicos, who made
their debut to justify the fourth term of the dictator Díaz in 1892,
material progress was a necessary precondition for political liberty.
The only liberty for which Mexico was then ready, they averred, was
freedom of commerce, which not incidentally legitimated the foreign
capital pouring into the country. Díaz's regime was a "social
dictatorship," they argued, promoting the interests of the bourgeoisie
and those of the nation at large.
Comte ans Spencer were simply the most prominent of the French
and British thinkers whose ideas were discovered and adapted in Latin
America. Of course, as a "fragment" society of Europe (Hartz,
1964: 3-6), Latin America only imported portions of the European
intellectual tradition, and it adapted liberal ideologies to meet a variety
of desiderata, such as social control, as the científicos perhaps
illustrated most starkly. By the 1890's liberalism was an "officialist"
ideology, probably accepted most widely in those countries where the
export economies performed best.
IV
To better understand the peculiar features of Latin American social
thought in succeeding decades — necessarily a truncated and adapted
version of European models — a brief excursus on contemporaneous
eastern Europe may be enlightening, on the premise that movements
not present in Latin America may reveal something about the history
of those that were. One of the traditions so influential in the former
region having no reverberations in Latin America was
nineteenth-century populism: to most of us this was " Russian"
populism, although the ideology had its roots in reactions to the social
processes of the industrial revolution in western and central Europe
(for a summary, see Kitching, 1982: ch. 2).
Populism was an ideology starting from a vision of local society as
backward, even archaic, relative to the developed West. Industrial
capitalism, an irresistible force emanating from abroad, was viewed as
transforming local agriculture-based societies in undesirable ways. It
ruined, then proletarianized, the peasant and artisan classes, partly
through a process of unequal exchange between town and hinterland,
and between industrial and agricultural societies at the international
level. Moreover, capitalism at the local level was seen as degenerate
and essentially destined to fail against the superior competition of the
West. In its mature phase, populism was an ideology of non-capitalist
modernization, akin to socialism.
The best-known and most important variety was doubtless the
Narodnik movement in Russia. Its origin can be traced to the writings
and political activity of Alexander Herzen, the exiled aristocrat who
was the first (from 1849) to associate Russia's tradition of communal
property, the obshchina, and its council, the mir, not with a vision of
the past, as it was for the Slavophiles, but with a vision of the socialist
future. Herzen was thus the first to theorize the possibility of
"skipping stages" in moving from "feudalism" to socialism (see
Venturi, 1960: ch. 1).
In Russia Herzen could build on, and transform, the conservative
school of Slavophilism, a reaction to Hegelianism, which was
irrelevant in both Romania and Latin America. By the 1860's, Russian
populism, in its violent form, insisted that action was urgent, since the
transition to socialism had to be undertaken before capitalism had
triumphed in the countryside, immiserizing the peasantry and
destroying the obshchina, the basis on which a socialist society could
be constructed. The People's Will, viewing the state as the driving
force behind Russia's efforts to catch up with the West, assassinated
Alexander II in 1881, but tsarist reaction easily prevailed.
Clearly, such populist concerns would heve seemed alien to Latin
American intellectuals of the 1870's, for whom state-building rather
than state-destruction was the objective of the era. And many Latin
American intellectuals in the liberal era had opportunities to direct the
state (wittfess Sarmiento and Mitre), which Russian intellectuals of
integrity simply lacked, even when they spent years in state service, as
did Herzen himself (Gerschenkron, 1966: 189; Herzen, 1982:
253-83).
In Russia, populism and Marxism were movements with strong
Hegelian foundations, both dating from the middle years of the
century. Populists and Marxists both viewed the penetration of
capitalism into Russia and its consequences as the social problem, and
advocates of the two schools engaged in a modes-of-production debate
as it applied to Russia. While the populists strove to overcome
capitalism, to pass beyond it, Marxists viewed the triumph of
capitalism in that country as a grim necessity — or an accomplished
fact, by the time of Lenin's The Development of Capitalism in Russia
(1899).
It seems clear that however backward were Russia's society and state,
Russian intellectuals participated in European social movements and
social theorizing in ways not possible for Latin Americans. Herzen
and Bakunin, for example, were aristocrats with broad European
experience, and at ease in German or French as well as in Russian.
Bakunin was Marx's antagonist in the First International, and Russian
revolutionaries, frequently in exile, were continually in contact with
Western radicals.
The diffusion of Hegel's philosophy among Russian intellectuals of a
variety of social backgrounds was extensive by the 1840's, and Hegel's
dialectic was employed by populists like Alexander Chernyschevsky in
the 1860's to further develop Herzen's views on stage-skipping to
socialism. The fact that Hegel had little influence in Latin America
before the 1870's — or later outside formal philosophy — thus
tended to close off the obvious paths to Marxism and populism, both
of which ideologies developed in uniquely radical ways in Europe's
most reactionary state.
Polarization in Russia was a readily comprehensible process, and
hence so were the unique ways in which radical philosophies
developed; but it is perhaps more elucidating for the Latin American
case to consider social doctrines in Romania. There, as in Latin
America, but in contrast to Russia, liberal political institutions
prevailed from 1866, when a constitution based on Belgium's was
instituted.
Romania, the only country of eastern Europe where a Romance
language is spoken, achieved its formal independence from Turkey in
stages between 1859 and 1877. Thus, like Latin America, it emerged
from a patrimonial (if non-western) empire attempting to institute
administrative reform. Romania's parliamentary government was
controlled by an oligarchy, but like those of some Latin American
states, it underwent a crisis and partial transformation in the early
twentieth century (Mouzelis, 1986: 3-4, 72) — in the Romanian case,
because of the First World War and subsequent land reform. By the
postwar Treaty of Trianon, Romania's leaders managed to double the
national territory and population, as a reward for timely declarations
of war. Thus, as one of the succession states to the Austrian and
Russian Empires, " Greater Romania" was even more obviously the
locus for a debate about economic development than had been the
" Old Kingdom" without Transylvania and Bessarabia.
Romania's Black Sea ports had been opened to west European trade
by the Treaty of Adrianople in 1829, a date often noted as the
beginning of the transformation of the country as a grain supplier.
Serfdom was formally abolished in 1864, and exports expanded
rapidly.
As in Latin America, the West's influence in Romania was seen as
transforming and civilizing, dating from the Napoleonic era, when
Romanians began to abandon the caftan and adopt the dress and
cultural fashions of the West. As the century advanced, the use of
French became mandatory for all those laying claim to general
education. Liberal economics was associated with economic
development and the civilizing (or Europeanizing) process, and its
tenets were taught in the new universities of the early 1860's. In the
words of one student, "economic liberties were in harmony with the
movement of national rebirth, of passing to a European style of life,
of breaking the chains of the regime of Turkish capitulations." Liberal
economics was not only seen as a necessary guide for development and
a counterpart to liberal political institutions, but was insistently
pressed on the Romanians by Great Britain and France, which helped
guarantee Romanian independence from Turkey (Demetrescu, n.d.:
270, 274).
The classical era of free trade in Romania was brief, however,
spanning only the years 1875-86. The international depression of
1873-96 resulted in the closing of foreign markets for Romania's
cereal exports, beginning with Germany's new tariff of 1879. After a
customs war with Austria, Romania reactively turned to industrial
protection in its own tariff of 1886. Relatively inefficient compared to
"overseas"grain exporters to Europe, Romania could not compete in
the British market with Argentina and the Dominions.
Nevertheless, Romania's economic growth rate was more than
respectable for the last three decades before the First World War, as
wheat exports revived, and the country began to export petroleum.
The value of exports rose from 9 million dollars in 1850 to 136
million in 1915. Between 1880 and 1910, Romania's annual rate of
export growth, at 3.3%, was higher than that of the periphery of
European states as a whole (2.8%). And per capita income, at 307
dollars in 1910, was higher than that of Portugal and the other Balkan
states, excepting Greece. However, there was a price to pay: 80% of
all industrial shares were in foreign hands, as was 75% of the capital in
banking at the time of the War (Berend & Ránki, 1982: 83, 115, 123,
156). In addition, there is abundant evidence that the income
differential between the peasantry and other sectors of society was
widening.
The abolition of serfdom had been an instance of "symbolic
modernization," in J. K. Galbraith's phrase, and the peasant's living
conditions seriously deteriorated from the 1870's through the early
years of the new century: Romanian landlords had been able to
compete in the international market by reducing costs, i.e., by
squeezing more and more labor out of the peasantry (Chirot, 1976:
chs. 6-7; Eidelberg, 1974; Dobrogeanu-Gherea, 1977a). The great
peasant revolt of 1907, arising from the evils of latifundist (and often
absentee) agriculture, resulted in the army's massacring 10,000
peasants, and stimulated the efforts of those who sought to critique
the foundations of the " liberal" economy.
In a country cheek-to-jowl with Russia, it is hardly surprising that the
ideological conflict between Marxists and Narodniki had powerful
repercussions. In Romania, the two leading exponents of both
populism and Marxism had spent their formative years in Russia,
absorbing the radical ideologies of-Russian politics: Constantin Stere,
the leading turn-of-the-century populist, was born a scion of boyars in
(Russian) Bessarabia, and his Marxist antagonist, Constantin
Dobrogeanu-Gherea (né Solomon Katz), spent his youth in the
Ukraine. Their debates, and those of their ideological allies in
Romanian journals from 1890 to 1920, asked basic questions about
the path to capitalist development, including the issue of whether the
existing economy of Romania could be defined as capitalist,
precapitalist, or some fusion of the two. The Gherea-Stere debate
among other things treated the matter whether socialism was " an
exotic plant" in an agricultural country. It paralleled a less elaborate
but contemporary debate between the founder of the Argentine
Socialist Party, Juan B. Justo, and Italian sociologist Enrico Ferri over
whether socialism had a present, as well as future, in Argentina
(Romero, 1983: 80-81).
Stere deemed socialism irrelevant for a society with 88 peasants for
every factory worker. Socialism did not address the problems of the
overwhelming majority, he believed, and socialists had no chance of
taking power to implement their program (Stere, 1907-08: II,
320-21, 323). Industrialization, based on high tariffs in 1886 and
1906, had failed, Stere asserted in 1908. The basic conditions were
lacking: To become an industrial state, Romania required heavy
industry, and the production of capital goods in turn required large
markets. Romania had no domestic market of consequence, and no
realistic chance of competing internationally. Agriculture, Stere
contended, citing Karl Kautsky, Germany's leading Marxist
theoretician, was not subject to Marx's laws of the concentration and
centralization of capital. For Stere, the solution lay in destroying the
latifundium and developing agricultural cooperatives and cottage
industry (Stere, 1907-08, II, 188-89, 330; III, 60-61, 68).14 In part
because Romania lacked a tradition comparable to the obshchina,
Stere and his populist allies never advocated "stage-skipping" to
socialism.
Stere's ideological opponent, Dobrogeanu-Gherea, assumed the task
of demonstrating the relevance of socialism for a backward peasant
society. More important, however, was his Marxist critique of the
existing social formation. He was among the first theorists to argue
(in 1910) that traditional modes of production in backward countries
interacted with capitalism to form a unique amalgam — in fact a new
mode — and, in the event, a monstrous one. His novel proposition
can be contrasted with the fact that eleven years earlier, Lenin had
characterized Russia's economy as one in which capitalism, even in
agriculture, was inexorably eliminating its " feudal" predecessor
(1956: 151, 172-74, 182, 250, 347, 555). For Latin Americanists, it
is notable that Gherea 's effort to define a mode of production unique
to backward countries enveloped by capitalism occurred 60 years
before the continentwide debate in which Latin Americans
"discovered" modes of production by which capitalism subordinated
precapitalist modes in unique patterns.
Reacting to Stere's charges that Romania was overwhelmingly an
agrarian nation and that Marxist socialism as a program for the nation
was a an absurdity, Gherea held that Romania was already a
"semi-capitalist" country, and that the process of capitalist
penetration was too far advanced to "skip" capitalism on the route
from feudalism to socialism. Though contending that Marxist laws of
development were valid for a backward agricultural country like
Romania, Gherea conceded that such laws manifested themselves in a
much more complex and confused fashion than in the West (1977c:
456, 458-60).
In the same year, 1908, he wrote that Romania had a legal structure
appropriate for a capitalist society, but neither a capitalist class nor a
proletariat. Backward couintries such as Romania were becoming
satellites as the capitalist world-economy expanded. Gherea now
borrowed and reinterpreted an idea from Romania's Junimea school
— forma fara fond (form without substance) — whose leaders had
been trained in Germany and steeped in Hegelianism: In Gherea's
Marxist terms, superstructure had preceded the base, in that Romania
had adopted Western institutions without the social and economic
(14) In citing Kautsky, Stere did not mention that the former remained an orthodox Marxist, and showed in The
Agrarian Question how capitalism had revolutionized agriculture, albeit in more complex ways than industry. This
fact owed, in part, to the phenomenon of (non-capitalist) ground rent and the peasant's willingness to engage in
superexploitation of his own and his family's labor. Publishing in 1899, the same year as Lenin's The Development
of Capitalism in Russia appeared, Kautsky believed the vast majority of German peasants were already proletarians
or semiproletarians selling labor power.
conditions requisite for their effective functioning (1977b: 478-82).15
Commenting on the gap between the formal and the real country,
Gherea noted that the situation contrasted sharply with that of
absolutist Russia, where the "real" state of development was ahead
of that of the legal system. Under the circumstances, thought Gherea,
Romanian socialists should strive for the development of an authentic
capitalism, which would bring in its train an enforceable modern legal
system, instead of the sham the country then knew (1977b: 498-99,
503).
In " Socialism in Underdeveloped Countries," an essay written in
1912, Gherea elaborated on the theme of the differences between the
evolution of the central capitalist countries and their backward
dependencies. In the latter, evolution was much faster, and of a
different character, since changes in the form or superstructure
preceded those in the base. This situation resulted from the fact that
the advanced capitalist countries determined the evolution of the
whole system. Gherea proceeded to formulate a " law of backward
societies," i.e., those on the periphery of the capitalist center: "In
advanced capitalist countries, social forms follow the social [and
economic] base; in underdeveloped countries, the social base comes
after the social forms" (1945: 8-9).
For Gherea, backward countries in the capitalist orbit suffered both
from capitalism (in Romania, boyar exploitation of peasants to
maximize profits in the international market) and the insufficient
development of capitalism (its incapacity locally to destroy feudal
relations of production) (1945: 27).16 In this regard, Gherea noted,
the Romanian bourgeoisie had utterly failed to transform the national
economy, as its counterpart and exemplar had done in the advanced
capitalist countries. The bourgeoisie of western Europe had betrayed
its defense of the Rights of Man after 1789, but the Romanian
bourgeoisie had nothing to betray. While the Western bourgeoisie had
to fight for the creation of liberal institutions, they were subsequently
imported into Romania by a process in which the local bourgeoisie
"played the smallest possible role." Rather, it was the boyars who,
under Western influence, created the liberal state in Romania. The
local bourgeoisie, such as it was, took the place of the boyars as a new
"semifeudal class,"keeping intect many feudal social relations
(Dobrogeanu-Gherea, 1945:34).
Dobrogeanu-Gherea's magnum opus had appeared in 1910,
addressing the central problem of Romanian society of the era —
peasant unrest. The laconic title of Gherea's study, Neoiobagia
(neoserfdom), epitomized the proposition that a new and monstrous
(15) The Junimea was a cultural and political grouping founded at lasi (Jassy) in 1863 by Titu Maiorescu and others
who had studied abroad, principally in Germany. (Maiorescu, who had studied at Berlin, Paris, and Giessen, held
a doctorate from the University of Vienna.) The Junimea argued that Romania had not attained a state of
development corresponding to its adoption of Western institutions, and that the (failed) revolution of 1848 against
the Turkish Empire had not been the result of real aspirations of the country. Maiorescu was deeply influenced by
Hegel on the evolution of culture, and, like the German philosopher, believed that institutions such as the state
could not change the organic " base," i.e., society; rather, change had to flow from the latter (See " Junimea,"
1964:935-36, and Academia de Stiinte Sociale si Politice, Istoria Filozofia Românesti, 1972:1,353-96.
(16) A similar idea was first expressed by Marx regarding the Germany of the 1860's (1961:1,9), and echoed by Lenin
with respect to the Russia of the 1890's (1956: 659).
mode of production had reared its head in Romania. Put briefly, the
mode was a fusion of precapitalist social and economic relations in the
countryside and the economic relations and superstructure of an
advancing capitalism at the national and international Ievels.17 In the
traditional form ofiobagia, there has been three basic features: The
peasant was fixed to the lord's lands; he was forced to provide corvee
labor for his master; and he had to pay tribute in kind as well as other
forms of feudal dues (1977a: 64).
Neoiobagia was a hybrid form having the following defining
characteristics: 1) Its relations of production were largely feudal; 2) at
the ideological and legal level, it was overlaid with a liberal-bourgeois
legal system that had the effect of leaving the peasant at the mercy of
the landlord;18 3) it further included a tutelary legislation that declared
the inalienability of peasant land, and regulated relations between the
lord and the workers; 4) at the economic level, the system did not
provide the small peasant farmer enough land for subsistence, a fact
which forced him to become a vassal of the owner of the land he
farmed as a laborer or sharecropper (1977a: 281).
Neoiobagia came into being as boyars saw opportunities to obtain hard
currencies, and thereby to secure a flow of Western goods; such wares
were especially deemed desirable after the Westernization of the boyar
class had begun with the Napoleonic Wars. As a result, wrote Ghcrea,
Romania had entered the " great world division of labor" and now
"sends food to the West and receives from it industrial and cultural
goods." Concomitant with Romania's growth of trade came a
monetized economy, a development that required centuries to
consolidate in the West (1977a:34).
Thus for Gherea, as for many others, western markets had partially
revolutionized Romania's national economy. With the appearance of a
money economy, Gherea held, the exploitation of the peasantry no
longer had any legal limits. An extra-economic compulsion of the
labor force by the rural police (dorobanti) to enforce labor contracts,
combined with greatly increased periods of corvee labor, further led
Gherea to the judgment that Romania had developed " a double
agrarian regime... [one] both capitalist and serf-based...absurd,
hateful... a monstrous regime" (1977a: 80).19 "Neoserfdom,"as
Gherea styled Romania's system, had the advantage for the former
boyars of freeing them of all traditional obligations to the peasantry;
they could exploit labor without hindrance from the state, and
without having to deal with free workers (who might organize to
resist)(1977a: 82).
Gherea, as an orthodox social democrat, if an unorthodox theorist,
favored industrialization, and a rising school of corporatists, who
initially called themselves " neoliberals," soon took up the same
cause.20
(17) Kautsky in 1899 had implicitly touched on, but had not developed, the articulation of capitalist and precapitalist
modes of production.
(18) As Cristian Racovski noted in 1909, peasants had to sign formal contracts, a characteristic feature of capitalist
labor relations, but such contracts included stipulations for the payment of feudal dues (1909:10-11).
(19) Cf. Racovski's similar analysis in " Chestia Agrara: Probleme si Soluti" (1907: 40-41).
(20) Notably, Stefan Zeletin and Mihail Manoilescu in the 1920's.
The First World War resulted in a major land reform, resolving one
part of the agrarian problem. Now the tempo of the debate on
development quickened, as Romanian intellectuals and statesmen were
impressed by two phenomena — the failure of Romanian agriculture
to regain the position in wheat exports it had held before the War
(falling from fifth to tenth place internationally), and, in the latter
1920's, the massive industrialization drive of the U.S.S.R., which had
not recognized Romania's incorporation of Bessarabia.
In the interwar era, a number of economists — some holding German
doctorates — were influenced by social and economic theories then
circulating in Europe, including Soviet Marxism, German and
Austrian corporatism, the German "Historical" school of Schmoller,
and Chayanov's theories on peasant economics. The influence of
Werner Sombart and Rudolf Hilferding was especially notable, and
many non-Marxists subscribed to Hilferding's periodization of the
history of capitalism into commercial, industrial, and financial phases,
to which corresponded the ideologies of mercantilism, liberalism, and
imperialism, (e.g. Zeletin, 1925: 18; Manoilescu, 1940: 224;
Madgearu, n.d.: 5).
In the ferment of the interwar years, the economist whose work was
probably most often discussed abroad was Mihail Manoilescu, who
had trained as an engineer before educating himself in economics. He
was also "furiously ambitious" as a politician, in the words of a
British ambassador,21 and knew triumph and subsequent disgrace in
the rough-and-tumble of Balkan politics; in 1940 he ceded half of
Romania's newly-acquired Transylvania to Hungary under pressure
from Ribbentrop and Ciano. Manoilescu was the only Romanian
whose theories were known in Latin America, and his reputation as
economist in the 1930's was probably given a boost in the region by
his work as a theorist of corporatism. Both his economic and political
works were translated into Spanish and Portuguese in the 1930's and
1940's.
As an economist, Manoilescu's chief concern was with the relationship
between the purchasing power of a unit of labor expended in
producing a good traded on the world market in terms of the labor of
other workers abroad — a concept now called the " double factorial
terms of trade." Manoilescu held that labor productivity in industry
(manufacturing and mining) was inherently superior to that in
agriculture, by a ratio of four or more to one. This superiority owed
to "specific capital," i.e., the much higher value of capital per worker
in industry than that in agriculture. The Romanian developed a
mathematical formula that would array all industrial and agricultural
activities by their productivities (1929: 177).
Manoilescu, like Marx, Ricardo, and other classical economists,
believed in the labor theory of value; since labor could create capital as
well as commodities, it should be directed, he believed, toward the
activities that would maximize labor productivity. The issue for him
was not comparative advantage, as for Ricardo, since this theory
"prescribed" a division of world labor into industrial and agricultural
(21) Sir Reginald Hoarc to Foreign Office, 21 June 1940, FO 371,24992, Public Record Office, London.
specialists; rather, the issue was whether a given economic endeavor
within a country had a labor productivity higher than the national
average. If it did, he believed, its development should be encouraged
(1929: 183). Specialization in traditional agricultural pursuits required
four hours of Romanian labor to purchase the product of a single
hour of English labor. Thus international trade was a swindle, and the
world market, un marché de dupes for raw materials producers.
Protection for industry was justifiable, not just in terms of Friedrich
List's " infant industry" argument, by which an enterprise would take
advantage of economies of scale and external economies over the
intermediate run to bring costs down to internationally competitive
levels; rather, protection was justified because a sheltered industry that
had a labor productivity higher than the national average of economic
activities was a boon from its first day of operation. The more
productivity of a given good exceeded the average national
productivity, the more the domestic price of that good could
justifiably exceed the foreign price (1929: 161).
To engage in agricultural exports, Manoilescu argued, the comparative
advantage of domestic agriculture over its foreign counterpart must be
greater than the intrinsic superiority in labor productivity of industry
over agriculture within the country (1986: 234). Such cases were rare,
Manoilescu thought, since agriculture in Romania and other
underdeveloped countries with dense populations was primitive in
technique and was consequently labor-intensive. In sum, by
challenging the legitimacy of the international division of labor, he
was also attacking international trady theory, and his works quickly
drew sharp attacks from leading trade theorists in the United States
and Europe.22
This brief view of social and economic ideas in Romania illustrates the
kinds of European intellectual currents adapted by social thinkers in
that country. Although the Russian influence in Romania was strong,
that of Germany was stronger, of which trend Marxism provides a
major example. By comparison to Romania, the dearth of German and
Austrian social ideas in Latin America — as distinguished from those
in formal philosophy — from the 1870's through the First World War
is striking.23 The influence of Russian thought is simply lacking.
In any event, Marxism was anemic in Latin America — as were other
traditions of social thought of the German-speaking world, such as the
German Historical and the Austrian schools of economics. German
social science would begin to transform Latin American social thought
after the arrival of Spanish exiles fleeing the Franco regime in the late
(22) Notably, Bertil Ohlin and Jacob Vincr. Ohlin criticized Manoilescu's assumptions. Why should the average
productivity of all national industries be considered representative of that of the export industries? What justified
the assumption that the price level of factors is everywhere equal, when it was known that money wages in the
United States were more than ten times higher than in Romania? Why did Manoilescu only consider labor
productivity in his calculations, and ignore capital and land? Ohlin's " fundamental criticism" was that, in addition
to assuming factors of production can move from activities with low productivities to those with high
productivities, Manoilescu also assumed that protection causes the transfer. But why, Ohlin asked, did this transfer
not occur without protection, since price signals should favor the industries with higher productivities (1931:
34-36)? Viner made similiar criticisms in his review of Manoilescu's book (1932:122,125).
(23) In philosophy, neo-idealism found an effective proponent in the Argentinian Alejandro Korn.
1930's. Many of these men, of whom Ortega y Gasset was only the
most famous, had studied in Germany and promoted the translation
of German works into Spanish.24
The Latin Americans' greater familiarity with French, British, and
Spanish thought probably tended to limit their knowledge of
Marxism, if one can accept Perry Anderson's judgement that there
were no significant contributions to Marxist theory in France, Great
Britain, or Spain, before the 1930's (1976: 25-37)25 Rudolf
Hilferding's Finance Capital (1910), which was so influential in Stefan
Zeletin's Burghezia Românã (Romanian Bourgeoisie — 1925) and in
Romania in general, was not available in Spanish, English, or French
until the 1970's.26
Another reason for a relatively slow rise of Marxism in Latin America
may have been Marx's own indifference toward the region, compared
to his interest in Sapin, India, Turkey, China, and Russia. He regarded
the Latin American political process as the embodiment of
Bonapartism and reaction. Furthermore, Marx had a low opinion of
the liberator Simón Bolívar, whom he privately compared to Faustin
Soulouque, the Haitian dictator whose bragadoccio Marx used to
parody Napoleon III. Marx's lack of concern about Latin America has
even provoked a study of the reasons for it by the region's leading
student of Marxism, José Aricó. (1982: 40, 107, 116-17).
Marxism was thus poorly understood and poorly diffused before the
Third International (1919), though the assertion is somewhat less
valid for Argentina than for other countries.27 Latin American
radicalism, like its Iberian counterpart, tended to revolve around
anarchism more than socialism at least until the 1920 's, and in many
countries until the 1930's. In addition, most socialist parties were not
exclusively or predominantly Marxist-oriented until the Third
International forced the issue in the early 1920's. One indication of
the thinness of the Marxist tradition is that there were no "legal
Marxists" like Peter Struve or Zeletin in Spanish or Portuguese
America, i.e., there were no revisionists who argued that capitalism in
backward countries would develop through Marxist stages, but that
the rise of a local bourgeoisie was both inevitable and beneficial.
Ironically, despite earlier twists and turns, the official position of the
Communist parties of the region in the 1950's would come very close
to " Zeletinism," because support for the national bourgeoisie was
identified with anti-imperialism and anti-feudalism.
The man generally conceded to be the most important Marxist thinker
(24) For example, the philosopher José Gaos, the sociologist José Medina Echavarría, and the economist José Urbano
Guerrero all resided in Mexico in the late 1930's and early 1940's. To be sure, Latin American readers of Ortega's
Revista de Occidente were aware of German thought, and many Spanish intellectuals had visited Latin America
before the Civil War. Ortega, a neo-Kantian, had lectured in Buenos Aires in 1916 and 1929 (Exilio Español en
MéxicoJ1982:814,868,975; Romero, 1983:128,134).
In our own day some German language classics are available in Spanish, but not English; still others appeared in
Spanish before their publication in English. Major studies by Werner Sombart, Henryk Grossman, Karl Kautsky,
and Fritz Sternberg have been published in Spanish, but still await their English editions. Both Weber's Economy
and Society and Hilferding's Finance Capital appeared in Spanish first.
(25) Anderson notes a new generation of French intellectuals entering the PCF in 1928, but perceives no
" generalization of Marxism as a theoretical currency in France" until the German occupation (1976:37).
(26) As noted, " peasantists" like Madgearu and corporatists like Manoilescu also drew on Hilferding.
(27) On the relatively early appearance of Marxism in Argentina, see Ratzer (1969).
in Latin America before the Second World War, Jose Carlos
Mariátegui of Peru, was also one of the least orthodox, and was
heavily influenced by Sorel. Mariátegui's principal contribution to
Marxist theory as such was probably his argument that, in the age of
imperialism, capitalism had arrived in Latin America too late for local
bourgeoisies to emulate the historic roles of their European forebears
(1980: 113; see also Paris, 1981: 145). Mariátegui would have agreed
with Romania's Dobrogeanu-Gherea that underdeveloped countries
suffer both from (external) capitalism and the insufficient
developement of capitalism at the local level.
Mariátegui was also heterodox in another regard. Though his position
was ambiguous, he hinted that Peru's indigenous ayllu, which he
viewed as an Incaic form of agrarian communism, could be the
foundation for the transformation from a semi-feudal stage of
development directly to socialism in the countryside. Thus Mariátegui
would seem to be a "stage-skipper," despite his following Lenin in
condemning the Narodniki. Nor was Mariátegui alone: The idea that
peasant collectivism could be the basis for passing from "feudalism"
to socialism was shared by a leading Latin American spokesman at the
sixth congress of the Communist International in 1928, Ricardo
Paredes of Ecuador; Paredes' views were echoed by a Uruguayan
delegate, Sala. (Internacional Comunista, 1978: II, 180-81, 367).
In the event, Mariátegui's praise of "Incaic socialism" (a discovery,
by the way, of Plekhanov's, a generation earlier), seemed to a
Comintern critic in 1941 a reincarnation of the Russian populist
tradition (Miroshevski, 1980: 55-70, esp. 68; Paris, 1981: 183). To
the degree the charge is justified, Marfategui appears to have fallen
into populist "error," in part, because of the absence of classical
populism in Latin America.
The reasons for populism's nonappearance in the region are worth
speculating about. In many countries there was no large peasantry, in
the sense of freeholders; nor, in most nations, was there a primitive
commune in any way comparable to the Russian obshchina. Yet
neither of these conditions blocked the rise of populism as a major
ideological current in Romania. Latin Americans, of course, did not
have access to the nineteenth-century Russian debate about capitalism,
as did the Romanians, but the late appearance of Hegelianism and
then of Marxism in Latin America may also have been causes of the
absence of populism. As Walicki and Venturi have demonstrated, the
rise of populism in Russia was intimately connected with intellectuals'
coming to terms with Marxism (Walicki, 1969: 26, 132; Venturi,
1960: 365, 384, passim).28
It is nonetheless important to qualify the absence of populism by
distinguishing, as lonescu does, between "populism"and
"peasantism" — the latter being a legal political movement based on
the newly-enfranchised peasant masses, occurring largely after the
First World War in the cases of Romania and most other countries of
eastern Europe (lonescu, 1969: 98-99). There is an obvious analog to
(28) Gerschenkron argues that populism shaped Russian Marxism, the opposite of Walicki's thesis, but the two
writers have different phases in mind for these long and intimately related movements (Gerschenkron, 1966:
190).
peasantism in Latin American indigenismo, a multifaceted ideology
finding its fullest expression in the Mexican Revolution, and
encompassing the glorification, "redemption," and study of
Amerindian populations. In the 1920's Mexico's minister of
education, José Vasconcelos, in a rare commitment to empiricism, sent
students into the countryside to observe local conditions. The
Revolution's interest in the '"real" Indian — as opposed to the old
regime's idealization of Cuauhtemoc, the nephew of Moctezuma who
resisted Cortés — was necessarily related to peasant land seizures and
the peasantry as the foundation of the revolutionary troops that
destroyed the Porfirista army. Thus indigenismo was linked to
agrarianism, officially part of the revolutionary ideology after the
approval of the 1917 constitution, which legalized land reform
(Hennessey, 1969: 42) ,29 In the 1920's indigenismo also had an
impact among intellectuals in Peru, of whom Mariátegui was only
one, and indigenistas there were able to obtain the institutionalization
of the Indian community as a corporate landholder. Yet only in
Mexico were Indian peasants widely mobilized — and manipulated —
as part of the political process by the 1920's.
This short survey of ideas indicates that Latin Americans were rarely
asking the questions posed by eastern European intellectuals in the
years before the First World War, and more frequently after 1917:
Does the capitalist mode of production prevail in this country? Is
there a "conquering bourgeoisie," or can one be created? Do there
exist unique local modes of production that interact with capitalism?
Can a reformist state create a capitalist economy? Communist leaders
in the 1920's, it is true, began to pose these questions, but the issues
would not be addressed with a sense of urgency and investigated with
sophistication in Latin America until after the Second World War.30
Granted, not all the social and economic ideas current in eastern
Europe before the War were applicable to Latin America. Since many
countries in the latter region at the time had relatively little surplus
agricultural populations, most of the post-Chayanov theorizing about
dualism, disguised unemployment, and peasant economic rationality
— so important in Romania — was not seen as directly relevant. In
contrast to their reception in eastern Europe, the works of Chayanov
played no role in Latin American economic thought in the 1920 's and
1930's, and the fact that they were only then available in German and
Russian was perhaps less important than the fact that they did not
seem pertinent to much of Latin American reality, although in
retrospect they seem relevant enough to " peasant" countries like
Peru and Mexico. Here the "technical" aspect of Chayanov's formal
economics may have constituted a barrier to diffusion in the Latin
America of the time.
All the same, the Latin American regimes and the prevailing liberal
model that "justified" them were being attacked from a variety of
quarters by the 1920 's, as for example in demands for state
(29) To me it seems more appropriate to use lonescu's term " peasantism" than " populism" to describe peasant
(30) Outside the Communist parties of the region, other voices attacked British and American imperialism, notably
Víctor Raúl Haya de la Torre in Peru, and radicals of the Mexican Revolution, such as the anarchist Ricardo Flores
Magón.
intervention in the social sphere and domestic economy, or in the
recognition of corporate property. The foreign trade model based on
comparative advantage may have been the most durable aspect of
liberalism at the ideological level, and its survival probably lessened
the impact of " root and branch11 critiques of liberalism in general. As
noted, many parts of Latin America were profoundly and positively
affected by Ricardian prescriptions of export-driven growth. Argentina
by 1929 had a per capita income approaching that of Australia, and
the real growth rate of its economy had been almost twice that of
Australia for 1900-29 (Diaz-Alejandro, 1970: 55-56).
The leader of the Argentine Socialist Party and the first translator of
Capital into Spanish, the above-mentioned Juan B. Justo, opposed
industrial protectionism as late as the 1920's, because he accepted the
role assigned to Argentina in the international division of labor.31
Granted, Argentina was the flagship of success before 1930. Those
countries where the export model was less successful, such as Peru,
may, like Romania, have experienced more intensive efforts to critique
the liberal development model before the Great Depression. Radical
intellectuals like Peru's Manuel González Prada had denounced
"feudal latifundism" in the late nineteenth century. But even in Peru
and other countries with corporate peasantries, the liberal model
seemed relatively successful to dominant elites; moreover, the
anti-liberal discourse was not offered at a theoretical level that found
acceptance among Comintern or other European Marxists, or, in the
case of those who championed national industry, among neoclassically
trained economists.
Well into the twentieth century, non-socialist theorists likewise made
little headway against the thesis of comparative advantage. A striking
instance concerns a corollary of Ricardo's doctrine, i.e., that there are
"natural" and "artificial" economic activities based on a country's
factor endowments, and that "artificial" industries should be
discouraged because they result in a misallocation of resources. In
Brazil, for example, Joaquim Murtinho, the Brazilian minister of
finance (1898-1902), would do nothing for "artificial" industries in
the financial crisis of 1901-02, since equal treatment of all economic
activities by the state would amount, in his view, to "socialism"
(Murtinho, n.d.: xiii). such was the policy that governments of the
region generally followed until the latter 1930's or later; it was not a
laissez-faire policy, however, since such regimes provided direct and
indirect support (e.g., through exchange-rate deterioration) for their
export industries and the interests behind them.32
In Chile, nonetheless, export-led growth, focusing on the nitrate
boom before and after the War of the Pacific, laid a foundation for a
manufacturing sector, and a Chilean industrialists9 association
appeared in 1883. This fact was less unusual than that some Chileans
favoring industrialization discovered and consistently propagated the
(31) Justo was not even a Marxist. He considered Marx's theory of surplus value " an ingenious allegory" (quoted in
Ratzcr, 1981:34).
(32) Paying their costs in local currency and receiving "hard" currencies for their exports, such groups profited by
obtaining more local currency as its exchange value fell. An unintended byproduct of this exchange policy was a
degree of protection for national manufactures, but this effect was partly offset by higher costs of capital imports.
ideas of Friedrich List. List found his leading Chilean disciple
between 1880 and the First World War in the person of Malaquias
Concha, who popularized List's infant industry argument (see
Concha, 1889: 327-28; 1910).
List was known elsewhere, but seems to have had little influence,33
and we may say that the central tendency before the Second World
War was that Latin American manufacturers and their ideologues were
apologetic, timid, and accomodationist — in sharp contrast, for
example, to their Romanian counterparts in this period. In the 1920's,
Brazilian industrialists advanced "practical" arguments: that industry
would provide urban employment; that it would save on foreign
exchange (through import substitution); that it would help agriculture
by consuming local inputs (such as cotton); and that it would provide
government with more reliable sources of revenue (through
consumption taxes) than the export sector could (Sáenz Leme, 1978:
161).34Latin American industrialists and their spokesmen sought a
place in the sun alongside the traditional export activities. This was
true of Alejandro Bunge and Luis Colombo in Argentina; Roberto
Simonsen, Alexandre Siciliano, Jr. and Otávio Pupo Nogueira in
Brazil; it was much less true of Malaquias Concha, the Listian
ideologue in Chile (Bunge, 1928-30; Colombo, 1931: 25, 27; 1933:
37; 1940: 3; Simonsen, n.d.: 6; Pupo Nogueira, 1931: 91-112;
Siciliano, 1931: 18).
Almost no one in the 1920's who sought to develop Latin America
along capitalist lines viewed export-driven growth as a problem
requiring fundamental rethinking, as would the Argentine economist
Raul Prebisch by the early 1940's. One of the few who tried to
explain persistently negative balances of payments and deteriorating
terms of trade for 1914-21 was Víctor Emilio Estrada, the director of
Ecuador's central bank. Estrada anticipated an element in the famous
Prebisch thesis of 1949—namely, that Latin America's terms of trade
for its traditional exports would deteriorate indefinitely. (That is, for a
given quantity of imports, Latin American countries would have to
supply an ever-larger amount of exports.) Specifically, Estrada, like
Prebisch in a more systematic way in the 1940's, attributed the
price-scissors problem principally to rising labor costs in
manufacturing in the United States (his nation's main trading
partner). This fact owed to trade-union activity, a pressure that was
lacking in the price-formation of Latin American goods, which were
chiefly agricultural. But Estrada did not generalize beyond his own
country, and was only groping for measures to offset the falling prices
of cacao, Ecuador's leading export at the time (Estrada, 1922:77)'.35
Estrada apparently had no influence on Prebisch or the structuralist
school the Argentine economist founded at the U.N. Economic
Commission for Latin America (ECLA).
A more likely candidate for such a role as precursor of ECLA was
Manoilescu, the Romanian economist, politician, and ideologue of
(33) E.g., List was cited in the Argentine tariff debates of 1875-76, but the episode had no significant effect on
Argentina's " open economy" orientation (Chiaramonte, 1971:136).
(34) More aggressive arguments, e.g. those challenging the artificiality of Brazilian manufacturing, had been advanced
by the Centro Industrial do Brasil in 1904-05, but to little effect (see Carone, 1977: 8-9).
(35) I thank Paul W. Drake for bringing this work to my attention.
corporatism, who recommended industrialization à outrance for
agricultural-exporting countries. In Sao Paulo, Brazil, officials of the
Center of Industries corresponded with Manoilescu, and published
Théorie du protectionnisme in Portuguese in 1931. In the early 1930 's
three important industrial spokesmen in São Paulo — Roberto
Simonsen, Alexandre Siciliano Jr., and Otávio Pupo Nogueira — took
the Romanian's work to be proof of the legitimacy of their interests.
Adding a touch of racism, Siciliano neatly adapted Manoilescu's
theory, contending in 1931 that Brazil could not continue to rely on
traditional exports, because of the lower wages that Africans and
Asians would accept in competing agricultural activities, implicitly
raising their labor productivities; thus agriculture in Brazil did not
possess any intrinsic superiority to industry (cited in Pupo Nogueira,
1931:133; on Manoilescu, 3, 131; Siciliano, 1931:12, 62; Simonsen,
n.d.: 58). Like Manoilescu and others in Romania, the three Brazilians
also tried to parry the charge of "artificiality" by pointing to the
apparent legitimacy of the coffee-roasting industry in the United
States and the sugar-refining industry in England, for which domestic
raw materials did no exist. (Pupo Nogueira, 1931: 136; Siciliano,
1931:27-28; Simonsen, n.d.:88).
Manoilescu "s prestige as an economist was complemented by his
reputation as a theorist of corporatism. As in the case of Marxism, the
literature on corporatism in French had a much larger impact than
that in German. Othmar Spann and the Sombart of Deutscher
Soziatismus were almost unknown, and the most influential writers
were probably Francois Perroux, who had taught at São Paulo, and
Manoilescu.36
Manoilescu's attitudes may have been as influential as his social ideas,
at least among the industrialists who first championed him. They
welcomed his unabashed elitism, his support of industrialization, his
emphasis on the role of the state in the economy, and his insistence on
the close link between nationalism and industrial development. The
ideologues of Vargas' authoritarian Estado Novo (1937-45) —
Azevedo Amaral, Oliveira Vianna, and Francisco Campos — wanted a
strong state, " rationalization" of the economy (chiefly cartelization),
and economic planning (Diniz & Boschi, 1978:59; Vieira,
1981:27-70).
As in the case of his vogue as social sage, Manoilescu's economic
theories as a "scientific" rationale for Brazilian industrialization did
not survive the 1930's — chiefly because of the attacks by Jacob Viner
and other neoclassical theorists on his work.37 Manoilescu's ideas were
slowly abandoned for more practical and circumstantial arguments.
Simonsen, who had frequently cited Manoilescu in the early 1930's,
had ceased referring to the master by the Second World War. In the
debate between Simonsen and Eugênio Gudin on economic planning
in 1945, it was Gudin, not Simonsen, who referred to Manoilescu,
viewing him as a discredited charlatan (Simonsen & Gudin, 1977:
(36) In addition to Manoilescu and Perroux, Gaetan Pirou and Sergio Pannunzio also influenced Brazil's leading
theorist of corporatism, Francisco Oliveira Vianna (Vieira, 1981: 31).
(37) Additional possible causes of Manoilescu's unfashionability were his open adherence to fascism in the latter 1930's
and his support for Germany in the Second World War.
108-09). Meanwhile, in 1944, Simonsen presided at an industrialists' -
congress which called for the " harmonious" development of
agriculture and industry, and championed government aid to
agriculture (Congresso Brasileiro da Industria, 1945:1. 225-26).
Despite the general absence of theoretical foundations for industrial
development, for those Latin American countries that had made
industrial advances in the 1920 's, increased self-sufficiency in the
1930's was a "second-best" option, in view of the sustained crisis in
export markets.
Over the decade of the 1930's, industrial spokesmen grew bolder,
except perhaps those Brazilians who had had initially followed
Manoilescu. Note, for example, the themes chosen by Luis Colombo,
the president of the Unión Industrial Argentina: In 1931, he supports
a moderate and "rational" protectionism, and defends the
manufacturers against the charge of promoting policies inimical to the
interests of Argentine consumers; in 1933, he even-handedly justifies
protection for both industry and agriculture; and by 1940 he attacks
the industrial countries as having themselves violated the rules of the
international division of labor by developing large agricultural
establishments, only choosing to buy abroad when convenient (1931;
1933; 1940).
During the 1930's, industrialists pointed to the vulnerability of export
economies, which they more frequently dubbed "colonial" in the
process. Governments, however, moved hesitantly and inconsistently
toward addressing the problems of industry. In 1933 the Argentine
Minister of Agriculture, Luis Duhau, proclaimed the necessity of
producing industrial goods that could no longer be imported (for lack
of foreign exchange), and he pledged his government's support for the
process. Yet in the same month the Argentine government supported
the U.S. initiative for general tariff reductions at the Pan American
Union Conference in Montevideo. Furthermore, as late as 1940,
Finance Minister Pinedo's plan for the economic development of
Argentina still distinguished between "natural" and
"artificial"industries, implying further that industrial development
would occur in concert with the needs of the agricultural and pastoral
sector (Argentine Industrial Exhibition, 1933; Villanueva, 1975: 78).
In depression-era Brazil, dictator Getulio Vargas was proindustry...
Was he not the friend of all established economic interests? But he
opposed "artificial" industries (manufacturing) in his presidential
campaign in 1930, and government loans to "artificial" industries
were still prohibited in 1937. Osvaldo Aranha, Vargas's Minister of
Finance in 1933, even termed industries "fictitious" if they did not
use at least 70% domestic raw materials (Vargas, 1938: 26-27).³8 The
contrast of these official attitudes with those in Romania is striking,
(38) O Estado de S. Paulo,8 March 1933 (Aranha quotation). Interestingly, the artificiality charge came from the left
as well. Cab Prado, Jr., Brazil's leading Communist intellectual of his generation, condemned the restrictive
practices of Brazilian industrialists in 1935 as an indication of the artificiality of manufacturing, which lacked a mass
market. It was necessary to create such a market through the redistribution of wealth before industry could thrive,
he believed (1933:128,133-35).
since Finance Minister Costinescu defended industries with imported
inputs as early as 1902 (Thery, 1904: 67).
Vargas only became committed to rapid industrial expansion during
his Estado Novo dictatorship (1937-45). Although he said he could
not accept the idea of Brazil s remaining a " semi-colonial" economy
in 1939, as late as 1940, when the coffee market was still depressed
after a decade of attempts to revive it, Vargas wanted to
"balance"industrial and agricultural growth. Only in 1941 did a
division for industrial development of the Bank of Brazil begin to
make significant loans.
In Mexico, industrialization in the 1930's made modest advances
while agrarian reform was at the top of the Cárdenas government's
agenda; during the War the pace quickened. Nacional Financiera, a
partly government-owned development bank, was established in 1934,
but only became seriously committed to manufacturing after its
reorganization at the end of 1940, when the new pro-industry
administration of Ávila Camacho took office. Protectionism in
Mexico, according to one authority, " begins in earnest with the
Second World War" (Villareai, 1976: 43-45; Blair, 1964: 210, 213;
Izquierdo, 1964: 243 [quotation]; Navarrete, 1967: 119).
In Chile, the Popular Front government of Pedro Aguirre Cerda
proclaimed the need for state-sponsored support for industry in 1939,
and Aguirre established CORFO, the government development
corporation. But relief and reconstruction following an earthquake
that year was another reason for creating CORFO; in 1940 the sum
budgeted for the development of manufacturing was less than each of
those for agriculture, mining, energy, and public housing (Presidente
de la República, 1940: 21-22, 95).
In Argentina, Raúl Prebisch was one of the government planners of
the 1930's who gradually convinced himself of the need to abandon
export specialization as the primary engine of economic growth. As
director of the Central Bank from its inception in 1935, Prebisch
began to formulate his theories of unequal exchange between center
and periphery. He assumed a greater rate of technological innovation
in industrial countries, and argued that there were different responses
to recessions by primary exporters and those exporting manufactures,
because of the power of organized labor to maintain high Wages, and
therefore high export prices, in the latter. These propositions were not
fully worked out until the latter 1940's, and were in part based on
U.N. terms of trade data available only after the War. The question of
how much Prebisch owed to Manoilescu was raised by Jacob Viner,
the neoclassical trade theorist, a year after Prebisch's "manifesto" of
1949, The Economic Development of Latin America and its Principal
Problems. It seems probable, however, that Prebisch's ideas followed a
different route to similar conclusions about the international trading
system and the urgency of industrialization in underdeveloped
countries (Viner, 1952: 61-64; Love, 1980a; 1980-86). Nonetheless,
Manoilescu's .theses in the 1930's must have created a sympathetic
audience for Prebisch's views in the postwar era, and one of
Manoilescu's major essays was published in Chile as late in 1947. It
appeared in Economia, a journal of the University of Chile later edited
by Aníbal Pinto, one of ECLA's outstanding economists (Manoilescu,
1947).
At all events, the fact that Latin American policymakers clung to the
ideology of free trade throughout the Great Depression seems to
illustrate how slowly received ideas die. The international trading
system was in crisis over the whole period 1930-45, but only at the
end of the 1940's did ideological shifts flow from the observed fact
that, in Argentina and Chile, industry's share of the national product
was greater than agriculture's. Mexico and Brazil would soon follow.
Admittedly, Latin American nations seemed to have more to lose than
did eastern European countries before the Great Depression.
Romania, for instance, reacting to the agricultural protectionism of
central and western Europe, had begun efforts to industrialize as early
as 1886. Almost simultaneously that country was threatened by more
efficient grain producers "overseas," among which was Argentina, as
the Romanian publicist Petru Aurelian noted in 1890 (1890: 21).
Another thing the Latin American proponents of industrialization
lacked, at least compared to their eastern European contemporaries
between the World Wars, was the strategic argument — of great
import in Romania, for example, a country that had doubled its
territory at the expense of its neighbors at the end of the First World
War. In the Western Hemisphere a Pax Americana had suceeded a Pax
Britannica during the 1890 's; thus Chile, Argentina, and Brazil never
became combatants against each other after the downfall of the
Argentine dictator Rosas in 1852, when Brazilian troops fought on
Argentine soil.
In Latin America, industrialization was fact before it was government
policy, and policy before it was theory. Contrary to the views of
Dobrogeanu-Gherea, who held that superstructural changes in
"local" or peripheral societies precede changes in the material base,
here is apparently a classical instance of a material transformation
preceding the change in ideological superstructure — although it
should be clear, from previous references to the importance of the
absence or the phasing of some ideas and institutions on the
development of others, that the argument is something other than
economic reductionism. And it is true that no matter how committed
Latin Amercan governments might have been to the international
trading system, government policy was sometimes incoherent or
accommodationist for established interests, including industrialists.
Still, before the 1940's, industrialization had few intellectual
champions, though some other aspects of liberal ideology had been
challenged much earlier.
When a theoretical justification of industrialization appeared in 1949,
the Argentine economy would scarcely have been recognizable to
intellectuals of Sarmiento's generation. They had advanced a liberal
project, if not a bourgeois one. Prebisch and ECLA would reverse that
emphasis, in effect inveighing against imperialism without abandoning
capitalism.
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